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Adoption of rooftop solar PV is hindered by lack of transparency about cost, equipment 
quality and government incentives. Third party quote aggregator platforms have the 
potential to influence both the consumers as well as installers and reduce overall costs by 
increasing the competition among installers. Our major findings focus on platform design 
and auction rules set by the quote aggregator and how this platform design impacts quote 
prices. We build a linear regression model with quote price as a dependent variable and 
competition and system related characteristics as explanatory variables. We use a 
regression discontinuity approach to study the impacts of four platform design changes on 
quote prices and transaction prices. We find that price reference provided to installers has 
the most significant impact on quote prices, as it lowers the quote prices by 0.10 $/W, by 
acting as an anchor. Our results show that premium quality panels cost 0.48 $/W more than 
the economy panels, thus premium panels are significantly associated with higher priced 
quotes. Further, we focus on valuation of panel quality to see if an online marketplace 
auction triggers a race to the bottom, sacrificing quality. We find that customers value the 
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premium panels at a greater price than what the installers are offering. Customers on an 
average pay 0.12 $/W more for a premium panel, than what the installers are quoting. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction  
The vast majority of residential solar photovoltaic (PV) customers in the United 
States procure PV by obtaining price quotes directly from PV installation companies 
(Mond 2017). More recently, customers are increasingly obtaining quotes through third-
party quote platforms, where a third-party quote aggregator obtains quotes on behalf of 
prospective customers (Mond 2017). Quote platforms and other market innovations could 
fundamentally change how prospective customers navigate the PV adoption process 
(O’Shaughnessy and Margolis 2017). In this study, we explore how quote platform design 
affects price quotes offered by installers as well as transaction prices actually paid by 
purchasing customers. 
Quote aggregation platforms allow customers to relatively easily obtain quotes 
from multiple installers. Customers create an account with the quote aggregator and 
provide basic home information to allow installers to develop site-specific quotes (e.g., 
address, electricity demand, preferences about equipment attributes). The quote aggregator 
conveys this customer information to a network of PV installers. Interested installers then 
develop quotes including a quote price, system size, and other system specifications, and 
submit quotes to an online quote platform. The customer is then able to compare all 




Figure 1.1: Quote aggregation platforms 
Quote platforms can be modeled as a type of multi-dimensional auction where 
customers compare products from multiple bidders (installers) along dimensions of price 
and product attributes (e.g., system size, module brand) and select the product that provides 
the greatest net value. Alternatively, the customers may decide not to accept any quotes, 
i.e., select none of the available products. The robust literature of auction theory shows that 
auction design plays a critical role in auction outcomes (Che 1993; Klemperer 2002; 
Myerson 1981; McAfee and McMillan 1987). Certain auction designs favor customers 
while other designs favor bidders. In the context of quote platforms, it is likewise possible 
that certain quote platform designs favor prospective PV customers while other designs 
favor installers. Prices on quote platforms may reflect the degree to which platform design 
favors one party or the other; lower prices provide evidence of program designs that favor 
customers, all else equal. 
The objective of this study is to determine the degree to which quote platform 
design affects prices on quote platforms. Using quote data provided by the U.S. quote 
aggregator EnergySage (EnergySage website), we study how quote platform prices 
changed due to four design changes made on EnergySage’s quote platform. Chapter 2 
summarizes quote platform design and the four design changes in our study. Chapter 3 
 3 



























Chapter 2: Quote Platform Design 
Quote platforms may vary along a number of dimensions (Figure 2.1). For 
simplicity, we break quote platform design into three information flows:  
• The installer information flow refers to the information that the aggregator requires 
from customers and provides to installers. This information flow may include other 
relevant market information like the number of other installers active in the 
customer’s market or average prices in the area. 
• The customer information flow refers to the information that the aggregator requires 
from installers and provides to customers. This flow includes all information that 
installers must provide in quotes to be able to post quotes to the platform. This flow 
may include other relevant market information such as average prices in the 
customer’s area.  
• The open communication channel refers to any open communication between the 




Figure 2.1: Quote platform design elements 
2.1 PLATFORM DESIGN AND PV CUSTOMER OUTCOMES 
In general, designs that optimize customer information flows should improve 
customer outcomes. Optimization in this context does not imply maximization. One of the 
benefits of quote platforms is their ability to restrict the flow of superfluous information. 
Individual installers may provide different levels of detail in their quotes and installers may 
use different formats when presenting quotes to customers. In providing quotes directly to 
customers, installers may employ various sales tactics to promote the installer brand or 
reputation that do not necessarily convey meaningful information about the quoted system. 
On quote platforms, customers can compare multiple quotes conveying the same level of 
detail in a common format. An optimized design provides the minimum amount of 
information necessary for customers to make an informed decision and restricts 
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superfluous information that may serve to confuse customers. An optimal customer 
information flow may include system information (e.g., size, module brand), installer 
information (e.g., years of experience, certifications), and market information (e.g., 
average prices in the customer’s market). 
Similarly, designs that optimize installer information flows should improve 
customer outcomes. At a minimum, installers need enough customer site-specific 
information to be able to develop an accurate cost estimate. Excessive restrictions on 
installer information flows could result in inaccurate quotes that may need to be adjusted 
in subsequent stages of the adoption process. At the same time, quote platforms can restrict 
installer information flows for superfluous information that may reveal the customer’s 
valuation of solar. For instance, installers may be able to use information about customer 
electricity usage to mark-up or discount prices according to the potential benefits that 
customers would accrue from solar adoption, a practice known as value-based pricing 
(Barbose et al. 2015; Gillingham et al. 2016). Certain restrictions on installer information 
flows may improve customer outcomes by limiting the ability of installers to offer value-
based prices. 
The effects of open communication are more nuanced. Open communication may 
allow customers to better communicate idiosyncratic demands to installers, and may allow 
installers to better signal the differentiated qualities of their services. Further, open 
communication allows both parties to obtain further information that is either excluded 
from or overly vague on the quote platform. At the same time, open communication may 
increase customer vulnerability to conventional sales tactics and value-based pricing, 
especially if open communication is allowed before quotes are posted to the platform. 
Aggregators can restrict open communication by masking customer and installer identities 
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to varying degrees. For instance, the aggregator may withhold all contact information about 
both parties but allow each party to communicate via messaging on the quote platform.   
2.2 DESIGN CHANGES ON THE ENERGYSAGE QUOTE PLATFORM 
For proprietary reasons, an in-depth description of the design of EnergySage’s 
quote platform will not be provided. However, for the purposes of this study, EnergySage 
described four design changes that the aggregator has implemented since 2016, 
summarized in Table 2.1. 
 






Upon registration, customers are able to view a 
map showing the location of other customers in 







The maximum number of quotes received by 






Installers are provided information about 
competitive prices in the customer’s market 







Installers are prohibited from sending messages 
to customers before posting a quote to the 
platform 
Table 2.1. EnergySage Quote Platform Design Changes 
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Based on the literature, we have expectations about some of the design changes on 
customer outcomes, while the literature is less informative about others. We study the 
current literature for the possible effects of these design changes and present the results 
below. 
2.2.1 Customer map 
Since May 2016, customers are shown a map during the registration process. It 
shows the location of other customers in the area that have obtained quotes on the platform.  
Social interaction and adoption by neighbors plays a key role in diffusion of new 
technologies and same is the case for solar PV adoption. According to Rogers (2010), 
diffusion of new technologies is fundamentally a social process. Studies show that adoption 
of solar PV is positively affected by the presence of neighbors who have already adopted 
it (Noll, Dawes, & Rai 2014; Rai, Reeves, & Margolis 2016). Bollinger and Gillingham 
(2012) find that an additional solar PV installation increases the probability of adoption in 
that zip code by 0.78 percentage points. In an online marketplace, it may not be possible 
for the customers to interact among themselves or gauge the status of adoption of 
technologies by their physical neighbors, but a feature like customer map can aid the 
adoption process by enabling virtual peer effects. Similar studies have been performed on 
diffusion of other sustainable technologies, like hybrid cars. For example, in a recent study 
among Irish households, a model of innovation diffusion is developed to simulate the 
adoption of electric vehicles. It is found that even if overall adoption is relatively low, mild 
peer effects could result in large clusters of adopters forming in certain areas (McCoy and 
Lyons 2014). Ozaki and Sevastyanova (2011) show similar results with a case study on 
consumer adoption of hybrid vehicles. They show that social norms and consumers’ 
willingness to comply with the norms of their groups influence the purchase decision of 
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customers. McShane et al. (2012) in their research show how customers are more likely to 
purchase a new car due to the peer effects and how these effects are moderated by the 
visibility of adoption. They show that visual effects are present and are larger in the areas 
where other’s behavior is more visible. 
Thus, an introduction of customer map for the customers visiting the EnergySage 
website can be seen as a visual representation of peer effects to the customers and it has 
the potential to act as virtual peer effects. Figure 2.2 shows an example of customer map 
implemented by EnergySage. It shows the number of people in the neighborhood of a 
Boston based customer, who has requested quotes via EnergySage.  
 
 
Figure 2.2. Screenshot of the customer map from EnergySage website 
This new feature does not provide customers with any additional information about 
price expectations, but it may still empower customers to seek additional quotes and push 
for lower prices. 
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2.2.2 Quote cap 
Since July 2016, a cap has been set on the maximum number of quotes that can be 
made for a given customer. 
The effects of the quote cap, in particular, are ambiguous. EnergySage implemented 
the cap in response to customer and installer feedback of information overload on the 
platform when large numbers of installers submitted quotes to the same customer. Capping 
the number of quotes received could inflate prices, given findings that quote prices 
generally decline with the number of quotes received (O’Shaughnessy and Margolis 2017).  
At the same time, the effects of the number of quotes received on prices are 
diminishing in strategic bidding models (Friedman 1957; Holt 1980; McAfee and 
McMillan 1987), such that the quote cap may not have a significant positive impact on 
prices and may allow customers to compare quotes more efficiently. Gilley and Karels 
(1981), in their study, find that individual bids decrease, i.e., they become less competitive, 
as the number of bidders increases. This can be attributed to bidders rationally taking into 
account the winner’s curse and adjusting for it. The winner’s curse refers to the tendency 
for the winner of an auction to bid higher than the actual value of object on sale. In order 
to win, the winner overcompensates and ends up paying higher. Thus, increasing the 
number of bidders above a certain number can change the effect of competition on the 
quote values. 
Also, it may be possible that when there was no cap on the maximum allowed 
quotes, there were some non-serious bidders who were also submitting bids. Such bids 
would have been non-competitive in nature. Now, with the implementation of quote cap, 
one must quickly book a slot before the bids reach the cap limit. So, there is a chance that 
the serious bidders may be preemptive in booking their slot and being serious bidders, they 
might offer competitive bids. 
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2.2.3 Price reference 
Since March 2017, a price reference has been introduced for the installers where 
they are provided information about competitive prices in the customer’s area before 
submitting a quote. 
The price reference change may have different impacts on the quote prices of 
different installers. Price reference change has the potential to act as an anchor, making the 
bidders offer quotes nearer to the competitive bids. Studies discuss the presence of 
anchoring-and-adjustment effect, while making judgements under uncertainty, which leads 
to an insufficient adjustment away from the anchor and makes the decision makers biased 
towards the anchor (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001) apply 
the same concept of anchors to negotiations between buyer and seller. They find that first 
offers act as anchors and conclude that first offers act as strong predictors of final 
settlement prices. Since price reference acts as an indication of competitive prices, it can 
be considered as a first offer, and it may lead to lower quote prices by acting as an anchor.  
Further, Beggs and Graddy (2009) define rational learning as the use of a relevant 
reference to learn an unobservable quality. Thus, price reference change may allow some 
above average-price installers to learn about their non-competitive quote prices, inducing 
these installers to offer lower prices after the change. At the same time, the price reference 
change may have signaled to below average-price installers that these installers could 
afford to mark up prices without losing customers. Thus, the net effect of the price 
reference change is ex ante ambiguous.  
2.2.4 No pre-quote-messaging 
Since June 2017, installer’s ability to send messages to customers prior to offering 
a quote was removed.  
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The no pre-quote messaging change was likely to induce installers to offer lower 
prices, as the change removes the possibility of price markups from pre-quote sales tactics 
or value-based pricing. Ulaga and Eggert suggest that relationship benefits have a stronger 
potential for differentiation, than cost considerations. They suggest supplier’s service 
support and personal interaction as core differentiators (Ulaga and Eggart 2006). Thus, pre-
quote messaging may allow the suppliers to create stronger relations with customers and 
allow them to offer higher prices. However, the no pre-quote messaging change could 
negatively affect customers that are more interested in premium products, as it may be 
more difficult to signal a willingness to pay for premium equipment without pre-quote 
messaging. 
The remainder of this report empirically tests the effects of the four quote platform 
















Chapter 3: Data and Methods 
In this chapter, we discuss the data made available by EnergySage and the statistical 
methods applied on the dataset. In section 3.1, we summarize the dataset with details on 
number of quotes and system characteristics contained in the dataset. In section 3.2, we 
explain our main regression model and the explanatory variables used in the model. 
Further, we explain the modifications made to the model to incorporate the four design 
changes. 
3.1 DATASET 
EnergySage, established in 2009, is an online platform for turnkey solar PV 
systems. It is based in Boston and is active in over 30 states. It allows customers to compare 
options on solar contractors through its online marketplace. EnergySage’s platform takes 
relevant information from the customers and shows them multiple bids. The customers 
compare bids and select the best valued bid based on their preferences. 
EnergySage provided us data on 138,183 residential PV quotes made to 42,974 
customers in 36 states and Washington, DC between 2013 and third quarter (Q3) 2017 to 
support our analysis. The data include a rich set of system characteristics such as quote 
price ($/W), system size (kW), equipment used (modules, inverters), and temporal 
variables such as quote date. To simplify the analysis, all quotes without an up-front 
purchase option (N=2,631) were dropped, such that an up-front system price is available 
for all remaining quotes in the dataset.  
Further, about 7,000 quotes containing missing values and null values were 
dropped. Also, there were a few quotes with a very high/ very low quote price and few 
quotes with system size greater than 1,000 kW. These quotes were dropped as well, since 
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they were outliers likely due to incorrect data entry. We also leave out quotes by installers 
with less than 10 quotes. This is because, later in our analysis, we take installers as fixed 
effects using the dummy variables approach. There are more than 400 installers, with some 
small installers having too few quotes. Because of these small installers, taking dummy 
variables for each of the 400 installers yields a sparse matrix. Such a linear regression 
model suffers from high computation cost and high multicollinearity. So, we drop the 
installers with less than 10 quotes. Thus, the final analysis dataset consists of 128,009 
quotes made to 41,933 customers. 
EnergySage also provided an indicator variable for whether a quote was ultimately 
accepted by a customer. Further they provided data on over 60,000 installer intents, where 
an installer expressed interest in bidding to a given customer but did not ultimately submit 
a quote. Installers in the EnergySage network are able to see the number of intents before 
submitting a bid to a customer. Installer intents provide a key input into our regression 
model, described in the following subsection. 
3.2 REGRESSION MODEL 
First, we build a preliminary model with quote price as the dependent variable. We 
intend to explain the quote price using a linear regression model with explanatory variables 
based on system related characteristics (system size, type of inverter, panel quality etc.), 
competition and temporal variables (quote date). 
Installers, during EnergySage’s bidding process, are unaware about the rival 
installers and the prices they quote. But, they are able to see the number of interested 
installers at the time of submitting their bid. The final number of installers who actually 
bid to a customer may be less than this initial number of installers who had shown intent. 
So, the installers see this number, i.e., the number of initial intents, when making a bid. 
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Thus, they perceive this number as the expected competition and react to it. We refer to 
this number of installer intents, as the expected competition. 
We assume this expected competition to have a direct impact on quote prices. There 
have been a number of studies on the competition effect. The competition effect states that 
an increase in number of competitors leads to lower and more competitive bids (Carr 1983; 
Harris and Raviv 1981; McAfee and McMillan 1987). Thus, we base our assumption on 
the competition effect and believe that expected competition should have a negative effect 
on the prices. Further, the competition effect may not be linear. Most strategic bidding 
models assume that number of competitors has a non-linear effect on the quote prices 
(Lorentziadis 2016; McAfee and McMillan 1987; Rothkopf and Harstad 1994). They 
assume that moving from one installer to two installers has a greater effect on prices than 
moving from two installers to three. We take log transformation of expected competition 
to account for this non-linearity. Thus, natural log of expected competition is one of our 
explanatory variables.  
System related explanatory variables are represented in the form of matrix X. The 
quote date (the date when an installer made a quote) is converted to quarter variable, i.e., 
each date is mapped to its corresponding quarter, and taken as a linear variable. We assume 
that quote prices should decrease nearly linearly with respect to the quarter in which the 
quote was made. To verify the same, we plot the average quote price for each quarter. The 




Figure 3.1: Average quote price vs. Quarter 
 
We take quarter as another explanatory variable and assume that solar prices have 
a continuous negative trend with respect to time, and that this trend is almost linear. The 
following linear regression model is set up (shown in Equation (1)) with quote price as the 
dependent variable. 
Equation (1) is:  
p = comp·λ + quarter·α + X·β + CTY + INST + Ɛ. 
Here, p is the quote price ($/W), comp is natural log of expected competition, 
quarter represents the quarter of each quote date, and X is a matrix containing variables 
system size, system size squared, annual electricity use, dummy variables for panel rating 
and type of inverter. CTY is a county fixed effect, INST is an installer fixed effect and Ɛ is 
the error term.  
λ shows the effect of doubling of competition on the quote prices, since comp is 



























in the value of quarter. β is a vector of coefficients representing the effect on quote prices 
of the system related information contained in X. Let this be model (1). 
Table 3.1 contains descriptions of all variables as well as summary statistics. 
 
Variable Units Description Mean/ Range 
p: quote price $/W 
The quote price per Watt being offered by 






Natural log of total number of interested 
installers 
1.60 
quarter 3 months 
Quarter label given to each quote date 
accordingly 
1 to 20 
CTY: county X 
Fixed effect to control for geographical 
differences in prices 
X 
INST: installer X 
Fixed effect to control for installer price 
differences 
X 
system size kW 






Control for diminishing return to 














factor: micro*, DC 
optimizer, string 





Table 3.1: Summary statistics and description for explanatory variables 
 
For incorporating the county and installer fixed effects, we use the dummy variables 
method. We add a dummy variable for each county and each installer. These dummy 
variables are binary and take a value 1 for quotes from the county (or installer) represented 
by that dummy and take value 0 for rest of the quotes from all other counties (or installers). 
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Also, we drop one dummy variable for county and one dummy variable for installer to 
remove exact multicollinearity from our regression. Similarly, dummy variables are added 
for standard and premium panels with economy as the reference. Dummy variables are 
added for DC optimizer and string inverters with micro inverter as reference. 
After setting up the linear regression, we add the four indicator variables to this 
regression, to gauge the effects of the four design changes made by EnergySage. We use 
the concept of regression discontinuity to analyze the impact of these four changes.  
Regression discontinuity requires addition of an indicator variable based on a running 
variable. The running variable has a cutoff limit above which the indicator variable takes 
value one and below which it takes the value zero. In our regression model, quarter is taken 
as the running variable. The dates when the design changes were implemented are taken as 
the cutoff limits. The indicator variables take value 0 before these cutoff dates and value 1 
after the cutoff date. Table 3.2 shows distribution of quotes for the four indicator variables, 
before and after the design changes were made. 
 
Variable Quotes before design change Quotes after design change 
Customer map 25,781 102,228 
Quote cap 33,345 94,664 
Price reference 81,536 46,473 
No pre-quote messaging 108,729 19,280 
Table 3.2: Distribution of indicator variables before and after the design changes 
 
The following modified linear regression equation is setup (shown in Equation (2)) 
with the four indicator variables to account for the four design changes. 
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Equation (2) is:  
p = comp·λ + quarter·α + X·β + customer map·βcm + quote cap·βqc+ price 
reference·βp + no pre-quote messaging·βpm + CTY + INST + Ɛ.                                                                            
The coefficients of the indicator variables reflect the impact of these design changes 
on quote prices. Let this be model (2). 
Up to this point, we take the complete dataset with all quotes and run our regression 
model. The objective here was to analyze the installer based strategies as the competition 
and other factors change and as various design changes are brought into effect in the 
auction process. Thus, since our focus is on quote prices and how the installers adjust their 
quote prices in different auction settings, we apply our regression model to the full sample 
of quotes provided by installers to customers. 
After analyzing the quote prices in models (1) and (2), we restrict the dataset to 
only the accepted quotes, i.e., the winning quotes offered by the installers which were 
finally accepted by customers. We run the same regressions, on this restricted dataset (let 
the corresponding new models be (3) and (4)). Model (3) is analogous to model (1), i.e., it 
does not include the platform design change indicators and model (4) is analogous to model 
(2), i.e., it does include the design change indictors. We restrict our dataset to understand 
how the customers actually value the system characteristics with specific focus on panel 
quality. There is a general concern that online auctioning of solar PV may lead to 
deteriorating quality of equipment being offered. The reason is that customers may place 
too much emphasis on price and this may result in a race to the bottom, where quality is 
neglected. Thus, to assess this concern we focus on panel quality. 
Thus, repeating the same regression on both datasets enables us to directly compare 
how the installers price standard and premium panels (from all quotes dataset) and how 
much the customers are willing to pay for the standard and premium panels (from the 
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accepted quotes dataset). Also, we can compare the effect of competition between all the 
quotes available in the market and the quotes that actually go on to win the bid.  
As discussed, we specifically focus on the coefficients related to panel quality and 
competition in models (3) and (4) and see if their values change significantly from that of 




















Chapter 4: Results 
In this chapter, we discuss the results for the regressions presented in section 3.2. 
In section 4.1, we discuss the basic results, where we show the effect of competition, time 
and panel quality on the quote prices. In section 4.2, we discuss the impact of the four 
design changes on quote prices offered by the installers and provide an additional 
robustness check for our model. In section 4.3, we focus on valuation of panel quality and 
see if the customers are sacrificing quality in favor of lower prices. 
4.1 BASIC RESULTS 
Table 4.1 shows the results for the four regressions. The first column, i.e., 
regression (1), shows results for the basic linear regression without including any of the 
design changes. This model is to show the robustness of results with respect to the impact 
of system size, quarter and expected competition on the quote prices. As shown, the 
coefficients for these explanatory variables are very similar between the basic model and 
the modified model with all design changes included. Thus, the analysis is robust to design 
changes, i.e., the effect of the mentioned variables on quote price is well explained by our 
model.  
Further, we can analyze the effect of these variables on quote prices. The comp 
variable is natural log of the expected competition; thus, we can interpret its coefficient as 
the effect of doubling of competitors on the quote price. It has coefficient -0.022 in the 
basic model and coefficient -0.0388 in the final model, i.e., regression (2) of Table 4.1. 
This means that as the competition is doubled the quote price goes down almost by 0.04 
$/W. Thus, installers offer lower prices when expecting more competition. So, the 
competition effect discussed in section 2.2 can be clearly seen in action here. Our results 
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are consistent with O’Shaughnessy and Margolis’s (2017) results. They set up a similar 
model and run it on the same EnergySage dataset, with data until December 2016. 
Also, quarter variable’s coefficient shows that quote prices are decreasing by 
almost 6 cents per watt every quarter. Thus, our results are in line with the decreasing trend 
observed in Figure 3.1. There is a continuous reduction in solar PV installation prices for 
last few years. Similarly, standard and premium panels, as expected, have a positive effect 
on the quote prices. Standard panels tend to cost around 0.04 $/W more than the economy 
panels, whereas, premium panels tend to cost around 0.48 $/W more than the economy 
panels. This high difference between standard and premium panel prices also explains why 
most quotes given by the installers are for the standard panel. Of the 128,009 quotes, only 
11,058 quotes are for premium panels, whereas over 100,000 quotes are for standard 
panels. Thus, premium panels, which necessitate a higher quote price, are a niche market 














Y=price ($/W), t-statistics in parentheses 
Table 4.1: Regression results 
Note:   
* Statistically significant at p<0.01   




All quotes, no design 
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All quotes, all design 
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R2 0.52 0.53 0.67 0.68 
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4.2 DESIGN CHANGES 
Column (2) of Table 4.1 shows the results for modified model with the four design 
changes included. Apart from the explanatory variables in the basic model, we have four 
indicator variables for each of the four design changes. We discuss the results for each of 
these design changes below. 
4.2.1 Customer map 
Customer map, as discussed, may not provide customers with direct changes in 
prices. But, it may lead to lower prices by encouraging customers to push for more quotes. 
Also, it may lead to a virtual peer effect, with customers trying to seek out true market 
prices or customers trying to find out their peers and become more informed. We observe 
a negative coefficient for customer map (however, this is not as statistically significant as 
the other indicators), showing that virtual peer effect is in action. Also, it is possible that 
the map feature may convince new customers, who would otherwise not be inclined, to 
request a quote. Possibly, such customers place lower value on solar PV and demand lower 
prices.  
4.2.2 Quote cap 
In July 2016, EnergySage decided to put a cap of 7 on number of quotes allowed 
per customer. The major reason behind this was the feedback received from customers, 
about information overload. Seeing too many bids can actually confuse the customers and 
make it difficult to analyze the best possible bid. The coefficient for quote cap comes out 
to be negative with reduction in quote prices by 0.05 $/W.  
It seems possible that with no cap in place, many installers could be putting in bids 
just for the sake of participation. These bids would not be competitive in nature. Whereas, 
with a cap in place, the serious bidders would make a prompt effort to bid and come up 
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with competitive bids. Our interpretation is validated by the regression results of column 
(4), i.e. when we regress on just the purchased quotes. The coefficient for quote cap is 
almost zero here and it is not statistically significant. This means, the quote cap has no 
significant effect on the actual winning quote prices. Assuming that only serious bidders 
would go on to win the bids, our interpretation of the results seems plausible. 
4.2.3 Price reference 
Price reference has the most prominent effect on quote prices, and it is the most 
significant (in terms of p-value of the coefficient). This is expected, since this design 
change directly guides the installers rather than guiding customers and indirectly affecting 
prices. As discussed in section 2.2, studies have been conducted on anchoring effects, but 
these have mainly been on consumer side. We see the same anchoring effect in action on 
installer’s side as well, with installers moving towards more competitive bids. The decrease 
of 0.10 $/W for the coefficient of price reference suggests that after the implementation of 
this design change, installers have reduced their quote prices and have submitted more 
competitive bids. Thus, they have realized that the customers are going for lower priced 
quotes and to stay competitive they need to reduce their mark up. Moreover, installers also 
tend to believe that their competitors will offer a similar price, since they see the same 
reference. This should again make them offer more competitive quotes. This suggests that 
the price reference is the most impactful design change, guiding the installers to quote a 
lower price. 
4.2.4 No pre-quote messaging 
As discussed in section 2.2, disallowing the pre-quote messaging feature may lower 
the prices. The same can be seen in the results in column (2). The coefficient of indicator 
variable for no pre-quote messaging is negative, indicating that this design change led to 
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lowering of prices. As discussed, removing the ability to message the customers prior to 
making quotes should reduce the personal interaction between installers and customers, 
which would have allowed the installers to gauge the customer’s willingness to pay a 
higher price and would have allowed them to charge value based pricing from the 
customers. Thus, it appears that stopping this messaging feature reduces the chances of 
installers marking up a higher price. It can be interpreted that the installers might thus be 
discouraged from using value based pricing and from using pre-quote sales tactics. 
4.2.5 Robustness checks 
It is to be noted that in creating indictor variables for the four design changes, we 
are also splitting the data into two categories: old quotes and new quotes. This means that 
there is an inherent temporal nature attached with the indicator variables. Also, we have 
assumed the quote prices to be linear based on the trend observed in Figure 3.1 and taken 
quarter as a linear variable. But, it may be the case that there are some unobserved temporal 
effects, which remain unexplained by this linear quarter variable. In that case, these four 
coefficients of design changes may not purely reflect the design changes, but may include 
an element of temporal changes in prices. Thus, it may happen that a certain proportion of 
the coefficients of these indicator variables may be due to temporal effects.  
 
So, it is necessary to verify the robustness of our results. To do this, we restrict the 
data to two months prior to and two months after these design changes, i.e. around the 
points of discontinuity. The reason being that the quote prices won’t change a lot in just 
four months, as compared to change in quote prices over three years. We do this 
individually for each of the design change. 
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For example, the price reference change was brought into effect on 3rd March 2017. 
So, we restrict the data from 3rd January 2017 to 3rd May 2017, i.e., two months before and 
after the design change. Now, we run the same regression which is mentioned in Equation 
(2) (but, we keep only the indicator variable for price reference, since other indicator 
variables are constant in this time period). In our results, we still find a negative coefficient 
for price reference and it is statistically significant (shown in Table 4.2). We observe 
comparable results for the other design changes, except customer map, which is no longer 
statistically significant. Table 4.2 shows the coefficients for the four indicators, when 
restricted to 4 months. 
 
Design change 
Coefficient of corresponding 
indicator variable 
t-statistic 
Customer map -0.001 0.9 
Quote cap -0.038 5.0* 
Price reference -0.028    2.8** 
No pre-quote messaging -0.032  5.5* 
Here, we restrict the dataset to just 4 months around the point of discontinuity for each design change (2 
months before and after the design change) and run the same regression as specified by equation (2) 
Table 4.2: Robustness check of coefficients of indicator variables 
 
Note:   
* Statistically significant at p<0.01   
** Statistically significant at p<0.05 
 
4.3 VALUATION OF PANEL QUALITY 
The results for regression models (3) and (4) (i.e., on the restricted dataset) are 
shown in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4.1. As shown, the coefficients for standard panel 
and premium panels increase in case of purchased quotes when compared to the same 
coefficients in case of complete dataset with all quotes, i.e., columns (1) and (2). The 
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coefficient for standard panel goes up marginally to 0.06, whereas premium panel 
coefficient goes up considerably, to 0.60. Thus, we can say that the customers who make a 
purchase are ready to pay higher for a premium panel than the amount being quoted by an 
average installer.  
Thus, the customers value the premium panels more and there is a scope for 
installers to have a higher price markup, when it comes to premium panels. Also, it may be 
the case that installers offering premium panels realize that they are in a niche market and 
thus know that the customers will be more willing to pay a higher price for a quality 
product. Thus, these installers may be putting in more efforts to close the deal, by 
increasing personal interaction with the customers and following up more frequently with 
the customers via messaging services provided by EnergySage. Also, this is very 
encouraging from the platform perspective, since the overall platform design is not 
encouraging a race to the bottom, where customers prefer lower prices at the cost of quality. 
On the contrary, we find that customers value the premium panels more than what the 
installers are expecting, since the installers are quoting premium panels at relatively lower 
prices than what the customers are willing to pay. 
Another interesting observation is the change in the coefficient of comp in the 
regressions (3) and (4), when compared to that in regressions (1) and (2). The coefficient 
takes the value around -0.1, when the data is restricted to just the accepted quotes. This is 
significantly lower than -0.039, for all quotes. Thus, the competition effect is far stronger 
in accepted quotes than in all quotes made by the installers. While installers are reducing 
prices by 0.04 $/W for doubling of competition overall, the winning quotes see reduction 
of prices by 0.10 $/W for each doubling of competition. So, it can be said that, on an 
average the installers making winning bids are willing to offer prices a lot lower than their 
competition and this willingness increases with an increase in competition.  
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We also look at the spread of quotes based on the panel quality. Of the 128,009 
quotes, only 11,058 quotes are for premium panels and 7,396 quotes are for economy 
panels, whereas over 109,555 quotes are for standard panels. As discussed earlier, 
customers have an option to choose between performance and cost, while requesting for a 
quote. They do so by specifying if they prefer a system with most advanced technology or 
if they prefer a system with best economic value. We observe that cost of moving from 
economy to standard panels is marginal (4 cents per Watt, column (2) of Table 4.1), 
whereas marginal cost of moving from standard panels to premium panels is comparatively 
more (48 cents per Watt, column 2 of Table 4.1). Thus, we find more than 80 percent of 
the quotes to be for standard panels. While, premium panels, which necessitate a higher 
quote price, are a niche market with fewer customers expressing interest in them up front 














Chapter 5: Discussion and Conclusion 
Quote aggregator platforms hold a unique importance in the diffusion of solar PV 
technology. The solar PV industry has a relatively non-transparent market and the 
customers who are still in the early stages of adoption struggle to get proper information. 
In this scenario, quote aggregator platforms like EnergySage help in informing the 
customers about better prices, new technology and solar PV adoption status in their 
neighborhood. With multiple quotes on offer to the customers, the competition effect is in 
action and the installers are forced to lower the prices, thus aiding the process of creating 
a more transparent market. Similar to results by O’Shaughnessy and Margolis (2017), we 
find that doubling of the number of quotes reduces the quote prices by $0.04/ Watt. This 
effect is even stronger when we restrict the data to accepted quotes. It shows that installers 
who win bids show more willingness to offer lower prices with increase in competition. 
The quote prices show a linear downward trend with respect to time. The same can 
be seen in Figure 3.1. Our regression results confirm the same and show a four to six cents 
reduction in prices per watt ($/W) in each quarter. With more people adopting solar PV 
and with stronger efforts from policy makers to incentivize solar PV industry, the solar PV 
market has grown exponentially in the last few years. Thus, factors like economies of scale 
and learning-by-doing effects have aided this steep reduction in solar PV prices and 
continue to result in lower prices. 
The major findings of our research are related to the design changes introduced by 
EnergySage to their bidding process. Introduction of no pre-quote messaging and customer 
map reduce the prices. As discussed, taking away the ability to make personal interactions 
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with the customers before making a quote, reduces the chances of installers using value 
based pricing strategies, thus resulting in reduced prices. 
Customer map is an interesting feature introduced by EnergySage as it provides a 
visual representation of the peer effects. The customers visualize the number of people 
around them who have shown interest in the quote aggregator’s platform. This should act 
as a virtual peer effect and aid the final adoption rates. Customer map should aid customers 
in realizing the solar PV market size in their neighborhood. Also, it may push the customers 
to be more informed and actively seek more quotes from installers, thus lowering the quote 
prices.  
This has an important policy implication. The policy makers should use the concept 
of virtual peer effects and come up with innovative methods to spread awareness about the 
current solar PV adoption status. Virtual peer effects can act similar to peer effects without 
needing any actual personal communication with the peers. They help consumers get a 
sense of their surroundings with visualization tools like maps, which go beyond just 
statistics and numbers. Thus, the policy makers should educate the consumers about 
localized adoption rates using virtual visualization tools. 
The quote cap gives mixed results with a negative coefficient for complete dataset 
and a near zero coefficient for the dataset restricted to accepted quotes. The negative 
coefficient suggests that putting a cap on the number of installers has reduced the quote 
price. As discussed, this result can be attributed to winner’s curse. With an increase in 
number of bidders, there is increased prevalence of winner’s curse (wherein the winner 
over compensates and ends up paying higher than the true value of the object in auction). 
Thus, assuming the installers act rationally, they may have been compensating for this 
winner’s curse and quoting a higher price when the cap was not in action.  
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Another possible interpretation is specific to our case. It may be the case that earlier, 
with no limit on the number of bids per customer, there were some installers putting in 
non-competitive bids. Now, with a cap on the maximum allowed bids, competitive bidders 
are prompt in booking their slot, and thus more competitive bids make it to the customers, 
leading to reduction in quote price. 
Introduction of price reference, providing the installers with information about 
more competitive bids in the market, is the most significant change. This is expected, 
because this change directly impacts the quote prices by guiding the installers. The 
coefficient of -0.104 suggests a strong negative impact on prices with the introduction of 
this change. There are couple of things in action here, one is the anchoring effect of price 
reference, making the installers move towards more competitive effect. Also, there is an 
element of rational learning, since the installers are now able to better estimate the winning 
quotes because of price references provided to them. Thus, they gradually reduce their 
prices to offer more competitive bids.  
This has important policy implications, since most of the efforts on increasing solar 
PV transparency and reducing solar PV pricing are based on making the customers more 
aware about the market and better informing the customers about solar PV prices. But, an 
increased focus on the installer’s side, by making them realize current competitive prices 
in the market and disseminating information on factors that lead to more competitive bids, 
can greatly impact the solar PV prices. 
There are a couple of future research directions in which our work can be extended. 
One, is to look at conversion ratios in each step, starting from (1) initial interest for solar 
PV in market, to (2) the total number of people who manage to end up on quote aggregator 
platforms to (3) the number of people who demand for quotes and finally ending with (4) 
the number of people who actually accept the quotes. If a way of quantifying the current 
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interest in solar market can be established, we can study the initial conversion rate of this 
potential interest into footfalls on quote aggregator platform. Also, if we can get data on 
website traffic on EnergySage’s platform, we can see how the conversion ratio of web 
traffic to quotes demanded has changed over time with the introduction of these design 
changes.  
Second, given a customer profile it will be interesting to come up with probability 
of adoption for that customer. Customer profile may include their income, location, age, 
financial incentives available to them etc. This can immensely aid the quote aggregators 
and the policy makers in classifying the people into two buckets, likely adopters and 
unlikely adopters. They can thus analyze the policy changes that can be brought into effect 
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